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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #02767-84
9 May 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meetings for April 1984

1. Summary of key warning issues:

Soviet-U.S. Tension

Major Soviet exercise activity coupled with an unusual buildup of aircraft in the Southwest military district, a delay in troop rotation, difficulties in the Berlin air corridors, and increased reaction to U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, have caused an intensive review of Soviet political and military activities for evidence of a major change in the Soviet-U.S. relationship. An IIM is currently undergoing the coordination process and NIE 4-1, Warning of War in Europe, will deal with some of the longer term implications.

Dutch Decision on INF

A Dutch decision on INF is expected soon. Analysts expect some middle-of-the-road resolution that will either postpone an INF basing decision or give the appearance of accepting the missiles without actually allowing them to be deployed.

Korea

North Korea is building a large, graphite-moderated natural uranium-fueled research reactor at its nuclear research center which, when completed in an estimated three years or more, will be well suited to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The South Koreans are certain

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to-raise this issue in upcoming talks with U.S. officials.

Islamic Militance in ASEAN nations

The growth of Moslem activism in ASEAN nations is both an ideological and a social phenomena to register resistance to modernization and central government policies. ASEAN governments are responding differently. So far, only in Thailand and Burma have Moslem activists turned to violence against the government. The situation in Malaysia will remain doubtful as long as the government gives full reign to Saudi, Libyan, and Iranian operators who are vying to influence activists in the region.

The Bahamas

The Royal Commission's investigation into charges of drug-related corruption in the Bahamas has produced circumstantial evidence implicating high-level government officials other than Prime Minister Pindling in either corruption or trafficking. The Commission is now focusing on Bahamian bank records as well as suspects in U.S. custody.

East Asia

We continue to be concerned about the health of East Asian leaders. Marcos should survive, [redacted] until 1987 when his term ends. Taiwan's Chiang is declining and probably will not live to the end of his term. Reporting on Kim il Sung remains sketchy, although there are rumors of health problems.

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Liberia

Analysts worry that Head of State Doe's recent decision to slow the process of moving toward civilian rule may be designed to improve his chances of winning a presidential election in the future. His continued erratic behavior could, however, lead to his overthrow if it provokes dissatisfaction in the military.

Peru

U.S. and IMF officials are betting that Peru's government will survive until the 1985 elections, unless it appears that the United Left will win a significant proportion of the vote. The military might act then. The economy remains weak with only the hope that 1984 will not be as bad as 1983.

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2. Trend Commentary

India

Concern continues to be evidenced about the violence in Punjab state. The army has not had to be called in, but the government is in the process of forming paramilitary units to enhance security.

Iran-Iraq

The predicted major offensive by Iran in the al-Basrah region has not taken place and analysts are beginning to believe that it is on an indefinite hold. However, there has been no reduction in the strength of Iranian forces and an attack could be launched with little advance warning.

Cyprus

Significant concern continues over the stability of the situation in Cyprus. Analysts do not believe that Greek reinforcement by itself would lead to hostilities, and logic would seem to dictate that Greece will not take steps which would provoke Turkish military actions. However, with the exception of Turkish President Evren and Turkish Prime Minister Ozal, the key players have not exhibited a marked degree of rational behavior during stressful situations.

3. Key Collection Issues

a. Nuclear Proliferation

North Korea. The critical questions are whether or not Korea has or is developing a reprocessing capability, and whether or not it is undertaking other steps related to nuclear weapons development.

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India-Pakistan. What options is India considering in relation to Pakistan nuclear programs?

b. Africa

Sudan. More needs to be known about Sudanese dissidents and how they may be influenced by either Ethiopia or Libya.

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
- Chad. Attention should be paid to differences among Chadian rebels and between the rebels and Libya.

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Attachments:
Warning Reports

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Distribution:

1. DCI (w/att)
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3. Executive Director (w/att)
4. SA/DCI/IS (w/o att)
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6. DDI (w/att)
7. DDO/C [] (w/att) 25X1
8. DDO/C [] (w/att)
9. VC/NIC (Mr. Meyer) (w/att)
10. VC/NIC (Mr. Waterman) (w/att)
11. [] (w/o att) 25X1
12. DDI Rep/OLL (w/o att)
13. D/AG (w/o att)
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15. NIO/AL (Hutchinson) (w/o att)
16. NIO/AL (Low) (w/o att)
17. NIO/EA (w/o att)
18. NIO/GPF (w/o att)
19. NIO/LA (w/o att)
20. NIO/NESA (w/o att)
21. NIO/E (w/o att)
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27. NIO/FDIA (w/o att)
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29. D/OCR (w/o att)
30. D/SOVA (w/o att)
31. D/EURA (w/o att)
32. D/ALA (w/o att)
33. D/OIA (w/o att)
34. D/NESA (w/o att)
35. D/OEA (w/o att)
36. D/OGI (w/o att)
37. D/OSWR (w/o att)
38. C/COMIREX (w/o att)
39. [] COMIREX (w/o att) 25X1
40. [] OD&E/FO (w/o att) 25X1

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- 41. C/HRC (w/o att)
- 42. (w/o att)
- 43. NWS (w/o att)
- 44. DDI/IPC (w/o att)
- 45. C/SIGINT Com. (w/o att)
- 46. SRP (w/o att)
- 47. DDI/CRES (w/o att)
- 48. A/NIO/W (w/o att)
- 49. SA/W (w/o att)
- 50. NIO/W Chron (w/o att)
- 51. NIO/W Subject File (w/o att)

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